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Abstract—Recent research has taken particular interest in ob-
serving the dynamics between altruistic and individual behavior.
This is a commonly approached problem when reasoning about
social dilemmas, which have a plethora of real world counterparts
in the fields of education, health and economics. Weighing
how incentives influence in-game behavior, our study examines
individual and altruistic interactions, by analyzing the players’
strategies and interaction motives when facing different reward
attribution strategies. Consequently, a model for interaction
motives is also proposed, with the premise that the motives for
interactions can be defined as a continuous space, ranging from
self-oriented (associated to self-improvement behaviors) to others-
oriented (associated to extreme altruism behaviors) motives. To
evaluate the promotion of individual and altruistic behavior, we
leverage Message Across, an in-loco two-player videogame with
adaptable reward attribution systems. We conducted several user
tests (N = 66) to verify to what extent individual and altruistic
reward attribution systems led players to vary their strategies and
motives orientation. Our results indicate that players’ strategies
and self-reported orientation of interaction motives varied highly
significantly upon the deployment of individual and altruistic
reward systems, which leads us to believe on the suitability of
applying an incentive-based strategy to moderate the emergence
of individual and altruistic behavior in games.
Index Terms—Interaction Style, Reward System, Message
Across, Serious Games, Behavior Promotion
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the last century, researchers have studied the dynamics
between individual and altruistic behavior [1], [2]. This is the
most important target of analysis in social dilemma scenarios
[3]. For instance, in public goods games [3], [4], [5], [6],
[7], subjects have to decide between contributing with their
own investments to individual or social goods, thus deciding
between developing self and others’ welfare. Along social
dilemmas, this self-vs-others paradigm is also predominant
in education. Namely, the theory of Self-determination [8],
[9], [10] distinguishes between several levels of motivation,
namely intrinsic motivation - related to self definition of goals
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a Cieˆncia e a Tecnologia (FCT) with references SFRH/BD/144798/2019,
SFRH/BD/143460/2019, and UIDB/50021/2020.
and satisfaction from self development; and extrinsic motiva-
tion - influenced by external factors like rewards, approval or
competition.
Over the years, research on behavior promotion has taken
particular interest in the use of games to change players’
long-term commitments [11], [12], [13], for instance to
develop environment sustainability awareness [14], [15] or
non-sedentary behaviors [16], [17]. As an interactive medium,
games allow the promotion of feelings of competence through
feedback and rewards, and support relatedness through
social interactions such as competition and cooperation [9].
Therefore, we credit that promoting in-game behavior can
be a useful path to approach aspects of attitude change such
as the motives which drive interactions, given the growing
impact of games in players’ lives [18]. This line of research
can help to inspire the parameterization of systems aiming to
balance or enhance individual and altruistic facets of behavior
among people with different individual characteristics or
cultural backgrounds, as there is evidence that these intrinsic
characteristics are able to drive different game strategies [5].
Researchers have focused on studying how the attribution of
different rewards (ranging from simple scores to collectibles,
resources, item granting systems, achievement systems,
feedback messages, etc.) [10], [19] affect player experience.
In fact, although some recent studies, detailed further on,
embraced reward-based behavior promotion [20], [21], there
is the consensus that further research in the motives upon
interpersonal choice behavior is still needed [21], [22].
Altogether, this work contemplates the following general
research question:
How can rewards be used to mediate individual and
altruistic behavior?
To answer this problem, we leverage Message Across,
an in-loco two-player word matching game, in which
we implemented two versions of the score attribution
system, aimed at orienting the players’ interactions to either
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themselves or others. We then conducted a user testing phase
where pairs of participants played the different versions
without knowing what score systems were being deployed at
each moment. We extracted the players strategies and scores
through the course of the game, as well as their self-reported
orientation of interaction motives (between self-oriented and
others-oriented motives) to find answers for our research
question.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in
Sections II and III, we explore what interaction styles, as
well as ways to promote in-game behavior were identified so
far by related research, and can be analyzed to model and
moderate individual and altruistic interactions; In Section IV,
we describe how we implemented individual and altruistic
score systems in Message Across; Next, we include the
evaluation process in Section V, and present and discuss the
empirical results in Section VI; Finally, we summarize the
work and finish with future directions in Section VII.
II. FROM THEORY TO A MODEL FOR INTERACTION
MOTIVES
We started our analysis by observing what behavior me-
diation techniques were identified in social dilemmas sce-
narios. A significant amount of research deploying social
dilemmas focuses on collaborative interactions, studying how
can higher levels of cooperation and altruism be fostered. For
instance, Du and Gerla presented a mobile social networks
model, and verified, through multi-agent simulations, that
cooperation was promoted due to the degree heterogeneity
and regular moving patterns [4]. Correia et. al [7] examined
prosociality through the social attributes and responsibility
attribution levels reported by subjects playing an iterated
public goods game with uncertainty, alongside two robots. The
game strategies of each robot were manipulated so that one
focused exclusively on the public welfare - the cooperator,
while the other focused exclusively on individual welfare -
the defector. The outcome of the game was also manipulated,
namely whether the subjects survived through the game or
the public good financially collapsed. Results indicated that
the prosocial robot was rated more positively in terms of
its social attributes than the selfish robot, regardless of the
game result, and that when players lost the game, they tended
to attribute significantly more responsibility to the defector
robot. This trend may indicate that interactions with individual
motives might be more easily discovered or remembered than
interactions with altruistic motives, namely whenever a bad
outcome is encountered. Hilbe et al. [3] theoretically examined
several strategies to sustain cooperation in a public goods game
and volunteer social dilemmas, including generalized variants
of Tit-for-Tat and Win-Stay Lose-Shift. More importantly, to
define such strategies, three particular sub-classes of strategies
were identified: the fair-neutral strategy which simply ensures
individual payoff is aligned with the average group payoff;
the extortionate strategy which, in scenarios where mutual
defection leads to the lowest group payoff, is based on
ensuring that individual payoffs are above average (related to
free-riding and individual focus, not concerning for the others);
and the generous strategy which, in scenarios where mutual
cooperation is the social optimum, consists in letting co-
players gain higher payoffs, in order to develop social welfare.
We believe that strategies such as extortionate and generous
are useful to promote when allowing mixed interactions, as
they follow two opposite poles. In one pole, there is an
individual motive for interaction, without attention for others,
and in the other pole there is an others-oriented motive for
interaction, without valuing self consequences. Following this
line of thought, we further analyzed theories regarding these
two opposite ideas, leading us to further define a model for
interaction motives.
Hoping to exclusively study individual motives for interac-
tion, we analyzed several work regarding self-improvement.
Self-Improvement can be defined as a conscious desire to
improve self ability [23], a result of self evaluation. Numerous
research focused on what can influence this behavior, and
how it emerges in general task-based and education-oriented
scenarios [23], [2], [24], [25]. Kurman et al. [2] indicate
two major subprocesses of self-improvement: the recognition
stage, which consists in identifying faults or to recognize the
need for improvement, and the action stage which consists in
actively implementing an idea, that is, to take action. In fact,
self-enhancement – a pervasive motivation or goal directed
force that manifests broadly to promote and protect the posi-
tivity of the self –, is claimed to hinder the recognition phase,
but facilitate the action phase and overall task performance,
by which it is argued that self-enhancement is related to
self-improvement [2], [24]. Task-based scenarios as games
can foster self-improvement, as task-related self-enhancement
seems to effectively facilitate task performance, opposed to
non task-related self-enhancement [24]. Following this line of
thought, we believe that some multiplayer games can foster
self-improvement through their actions, by directing players
to embrace choices which individually improve themselves,
without directly taking into consideration the actions of other
players.
In order to study the others-oriented motives for interaction,
we examined multiple theories related to altruism. Seelig
and Rosof present several categorizations and review several
research regarding altruism [26], from which we highlight
Kitayama’s scale of altruism as masochism [27]. On a study
related to the dual nature of the feminine ideal in Japanese
culture, the author defines altruism as a continuum between
two facets. While the first facet can be interpreted as an
interaction consisting of mutual help between peers, the second
facet happens when people feel that it is important to do good
for others, even if it means the process will not be pleasant
for them. In other words, people engaging in the second type
of altruism are exclusively motivated by others, without even
trying to minimize the negative consequences that helping
others might bring to themselves. Although some research
associates this effect to Psychic Altruism, we will refer to this
interaction style as Extreme Altruism.
Fig. 1. Continuous space organizing interaction motives, between Self-
oriented and Others-oriented. Self-oriented motives can be associated to the
Self Improvement behavior, while Others-oriented motives can be associated
to the Extreme Altruism behavior.
A. Model of Interaction Motives
The presented related research approached several interac-
tion styles, from which two extremes were identified: Self-
Improvement and Extreme Altruism. In this work we deploy
both these ends of the spectrum, placing them as extreme poles
of a continuous interactions motive space (see Fig.1). This
categorization allows us to examine to what extent players
interactions are individually or altruistically motivated. In one
pole, we have an individual motive for interaction, without
attention for others, and in the other pole there is an others-
oriented motive for interaction, without valuing self conse-
quences. Given this interaction motives model, the presented
related research led us to deem that adequate indicators to
measure the emergence of individual and altruistic behavior
(besides extracting and analyzing the actual game actions and
scores) was to acquire self-reported motives for interaction,
comprehended between Self-oriented and Others-oriented.
III. MEDIATING INDIVIDUAL AND ALTRUISTIC BEHAVIOR
In order to verify how to mediate individual and altruistic
behavior, we also examined work specifically devoted to
behavior promotion. For instance, Vegt et al. [22] showed that
different game rules could generate distinct reported player
experiences and observable distinct player behaviors, which
could be further discriminated into four patterns: expected
patterns of helping and ignoring, and unexpected patterns
of agreeing and obstructing. Returning to social dilemma
scenarios, Rosen and Haaga [28] managed to induce higher
levels of cooperation in small groups of four to eight subjects
(higher number of cooperative social dilemma game actions,
and higher altruistic attitudes toward a specific dilemma story),
by applying message-based persuasion methods. In particular,
the authors defined a social dilemma differently to participants
in different conditions. To promote cooperation, instead of
neutrally defining the nature of the dilemma, two explanations
were applied: either the positive effects of collaboration and
negative effects of free-riding were directly exposed for the
considered social dilemma problem; or subjects were told that
the same task was presented to various professionals at a
conflict-resolution conference, who agreed that cooperation
was the only appropriate response to the conflict and was
necessary for societal harmony in general. Galbiati and Ver-
tova, on the other hand, studied the promotion of cooperation
through contribution obligations (minimum to which players
have to contribute) in a public goods game [6]. After perform-
ing several tests with no, low and high valued obligations,
the authors concluded that high obligations led players to,
in average, focus more in cooperating, while not reducing as
much their cooperative contributions through the course of the
game. Moreover, when the obligations unexpectedly increased,
the players re-increased their cooperation levels. Besides
obligations, research has studied several gameplay-oriented
reward attribution approaches, ranging from simple scores
to collectibles, resources, item granting systems, achievement
systems, player dossiers, and feedback messages [10], [19],
[9], [29]. In particular, rewards in the form of score attribution
systems are considered simple and appropriate mechanisms for
comparisons between players, as they can be easily presented
and understood [9], [19], [21]. They also have the advantage of
not affecting gameplay, which provides more flexibility when
parameterizing behavior. Based on this thought, we decided to
follow this simple route for behavior promotion.
IV. SOLUTION DESCRIPTION
As previously commented, we used a game called Message
Across1 to examine the dynamics of players’ interactions. A
screenshot of the game is provided in Fig. 2. In the course
of the game, players try to complete words as they advance
through the levels. Each level presents two words on the top
of the screen, one for each player. Because we wanted to
promote interactions which led players to vary their strategies
and interaction motives, and because we wanted words which
were easily completed, only four letter words with two letters
in common were considered in our experiments. In the middle
of the screen, the game presents a track containing three lanes
where letters move towards players. The track also contains
two markers, one for each player, arranged at the bottom.
Fig. 2. Screenshot of the game Message Across.
In order to select a letter, a player has to move his/her
marker to the lane where the letter is sliding, and select an
1The implementation of the game is available online, hosted in the platform
GitHub: https://github.com/SamGomes/message-across
action. When the letter collides with the marker, the selected
action is performed. If two players are in the same track, only
the first player that selects an action is able to perform it.
Players can perform one of two possible actions at each
moment. They can either take the letter or give the letter to
the other player. The objective of each player is to obtain the
highest score. In our experiments, each player could perform
a maximum of four actions per level, and a level finished
whenever both players had no actions left to perform. We
believe that a limit of four possible actions exacerbated the
players’ need to search for meaningful strategies.
When reviewing related research, we examined the dif-
ferences between individual and altruistic interactions, and
built a model for interaction motives bounded between self-
improvement and extreme altruism. To foster these two ex-
treme behaviors in-game, we developed two divergent scoring
versions:
• The Self-Improvement version exclusively rewarded 10
points to players who took letters that were useful for
them;
• The Extremely Altruistic version exclusively rewarded
10 points to players who gave letters needed by the other
players.
The duality between these strategies is apparent, as
the first rewards players which act for their own welfare,
disregarding the actions of other players, while the second
one rewards players who act exclusively for the others’
welfare, disregarding the consequences of those actions for
themselves. Given that these reward versions were developed
to allow players to understand the game in different manners,
we predicted two distinct trends, which we translated to
two hypotheses. Firstly, the players would embrace different,
opposite strategies. These strategies would allow the game to
motivate the players’ interactions the towards opposite poles
defined in our interaction motives model (Section II):
H1: The Self-Improvement version will implicitly drive
players to perform a high number of takes and the Extreme
Altruism version will drive players to perform a high number
of gives.
H2: The Self-Improvement version will implicitly drive
players to report self-oriented interaction motives, and the
Extreme Altruism version will implicitly drive players to
report others-oriented interaction motives.
In the next section, we present how we evaluated our
approach considering these premises.
V. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to evaluate the effectiveness of our score attri-
bution strategies in driving in-game individual and altruistic
interactions, we performed several experiments where pairs of
participants played through the different versions of Message
Across. In each test, the name of the game versions was
obfuscated by using the letters to represent them, and the
order of presentation of the game versions was uniformly
randomized between groups to avoid any potential learning
effects. Therefore, throughout the session, the participants
did not know how the game was being scored and had to
figure that out by themselves.
A touch screen was included in the experiment room for
players to interact with the game. Two computers were used
for our experiments: one computer executed the game and
other computer allowed players to self-report their interaction
motives orientation through a questionnaire. A Go-Pro video
camera was also included for observing player movements and
in-game activity and to help remedy some possible inconsis-
tencies in automatic data collection. The camera was attached
to a tripod and positioned approximately 50 cm in front of
the touch screen. The camera view of the our setup can be
observed in Fig. 3.
A. Sample
Participants were recruited, in teams of two, through stan-
dard convenience sampling procedures including direct contact
and word of mouth. Subjects included anyone interested in
participating if they were at least 18 years old. There were
no potential risks and no anticipated benefits to individual
participants. We conducted a total of 37 tests in a college
laboratory. Participation was open to outside visitors, which
meant that not all participants were college students. After data
analysis, four tests did not meet quality criteria, e.g in-game
data not recorded or questionnaires with missing answers.
Thus, our final data set comprised 33 tests, a total of 66
participants (37 males, 26 females) between 18 and 40 years
old (M = 23.12;SD = 4.09).
B. Procedure
The experiment operated as follows: (i) Firstly, participants
were informed about the experience and invited to sign a
mandatory consent form. They were also informed that they
could stop the experiment at any time; (ii) After signing the
consent form, both participants were asked to move next to
the touchscreen (as seen in Figure 3) and received a tutorial
regarding in-game mechanics and possible actions to perform.
Additionally, participants were allowed to play up to seven
levels without being rewarded for any give or take action,
in order to support the development of fluent playing skills;
(iii) When both participants felt comfortable with the game
mechanics, they played the two game versions in random order
with each gaming session lasting seven levels. After each gam-
ing session, participants were asked to complete questionnaires
measuring their interaction motives orientation regarding that
session. At the end of the experiment, participants received a
candy bar as a compensation for their time.
C. Variables
One independent variable was considered: Score Attribu-
tion System with two possible values {Self I, E Altr}.
Three dependent (within-subjects) variables were considered:
Fig. 3. Camera view of a group playing Message Across during our
experiments.
Fig. 4. Distribution of mean number of takes by score system.
• Mean number of takes (per player), the mean number
of letters a player acquired for himself/herself in each
level. The value space is [0, 4], as each player could
perform at most four actions (gives or takes) per level.
This variable was measured by analyzing game logs;
• Final game score (per player), the score obtained at the
end of playing each version of the game. This variable
was acknowledged to support the differences observed by
the mean number of takes;
• Motives orientation (per player), which measured the
motive behind players’ interactions, between self-oriented
and others-oriented. This measure was obtained at the
end of each played version, through to a question “Who
did I focus while playing this version?”, answered using
a seven-point Likert scale ranging from “Me” to “The
other player”;
VI. RESULTS
A. Mean number of takes and Final score
The distribution of mean number of takes is plotted in Fig. 4.
Shapiro-Wilk tests reported a non-normal distribution regard-
Fig. 5. Distribution of final scores by score system.
ing the mean number of takes values. Therefore, a Wilcoxon
paired signed-rank test was performed to compare the two
score systems, at the level of significance p = 0.05. The
number of performed take actions changed highly significantly
between the two score strategies, with a large effect size
(Z = 7.06, p << −.001, r = −.87). Furthermore, if we
analyze the distribution of the data, we can observe that players
of Self-Improvement score systems performed, on average, a
high (near maximum) number of takes (M ≈ 3.64,Mdn ≈
3.86, SD ≈ 0.37), while oppositely, players of the Extremely
Altruistic score system performed a low number of takes
(M ≈ −.58,Mdn ≈ −.57, SD ≈ 0.42). Even though the
differences are clearly noticeable, we can also observe that
the Self-Improvement data is closer to the maximum number
of takes, than the altruistic version is to the minimum number
of takes. This effect was possibly caused by the fact that while
searching for the most rewarding strategies, the players found
easier or more natural to start by taking letters for themselves,
which resulted in differences in the final scores (see Fig.
5). In summary, these results support that players implicitly
understood that the optimal strategy while playing the Self-
Improvement version was to take letters, and the optimal
strategy while playing the Extremely Altruistic version was
to give letters, even though these strategies where unknown
throughout the game execution.
B. Motives orientation
The distribution of the motive orientation values is plotted
in Fig. 6. Shapiro-Wilk tests reported a non-normal distri-
bution regarding the motives orientation values. Therefore, a
Wilcoxon paired signed-rank test was conducted, at the level
of significance p = 0.05. The motive orientation values also
varied highly significantly between the two score attribution
strategies, with a large effect size (Z = −5.73, p <<
Fig. 6. Distribution of motive orientation by score system.
−.001, r = −.71). By observing the distribution of the data,
we can conclude that Self-Improvement responses were driven
towards “Self-oriented” (M ≈ −1.76,Mdn = −2, SD ≈
1.43), opposite to Extreme Altruism responses, which were
approximated towards “Others-oriented” (M ≈ 1.12,Mdn =
2, SD ≈ 2.30). These results indicate that, as expected, the
Self-Improvement version was perceived as allowing players
to improve their gameplay, and the Extremely Altruistic score
system was perceived as a helping scenario implying that play-
ers’ interactions were exclusively motivated by other players.
C. Discussion
In this study we developed and compared the effects of two
reward parameterizations, representing two extreme behavior
styles: Self-Improvement and Extreme Altruism in the players
strategies and self-reported interaction motives. Notably, the
players played through several game levels, without knowing
how the game was scored. Results indicated that the Self-
Improvement version led players to perform a high (near
maximum) number of takes and report self-oriented interaction
motives, while the Extreme Altruism version led players to
perform a low (near minimum) number of takes and report
others-oriented interaction motives. Thus, our expectations
were corroborated. Moreover, the tendencies revealed high
effect sizes, which means strong differences were mediated
by the two score functions. It is important to note that others-
oriented interactions were still achieved, even though a limit
to the number of actions was imposed which could bias the
strategies and interaction motives towards Self-Improvement.
It is also important to note that rich and dynamic interactions
were promoted, even though there was the concern that players
could possibly deviate their focus to the game tasks alone,
without acknowledging their rewards. Furthermore, although
players acquired high scores in both conditions, they still
significantly acquired higher scores in Self-Improvement con-
dition. This may indicate a natural tendency for players to start
exploring the effects of their own actions, before exploring
others-oriented actions. This corroborates the argument that
interactions with individual motives might be more easily
discovered than others-motivated interactions [7]. The afore-
mentioned results reflect an important finding, which answers
our hypotheses and research question: our score attribution
strategies led all players to implicitly adopt significantly
different in-game strategies (mean number of takes) and to
report different interaction motive orientations for the two
game versions. Thus, evidence was obtained for individual and
altruistic reward mediated behavior. In other words, without
altering the game mechanics or awarding different game items,
players still managed to learn meaningful strategies, which
motivated them to interact in different ways, thus proving the
effectiveness of our approach.
Besides exclusively examining behavior promotion, this
study sheds light on the application of individual- or altruistic-
oriented rewards to regulate and balance dilemmas in which
the players’ decisions might be influenced by individual
differences and cultural backgrounds [5], [30]. Additionally,
these techniques can also be used for behavior change. For
instance, to promote altruistic attitudes through an environ-
ment conservation game, an altruistic inducing strategy can
be applied in a public goods game which aims to alert people
for environmental sustainability.
The further consideration of a similar strategy must, how-
ever, be treated with care, as in order to apply our strategy,
our game presented tasks that could be completed by different
means, but using the same player actions. This may not be
the case of the tasks present in all games. In more complex
scenarios, instead of using a reward-based approach per se,
this technique can be used to complement other interaction me-
chanics in ways that might be further investigated in different
serious games or in specific social dilemmas implementations.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we approached the promotion of altruistic and
individual behaviors exclusively through the use of rewards.
Our premise was that an altruistic behavior, modeled by a
full others-directed interaction motive orientation, could be
implicitly incentivized by rewarding players who contributed
to the completion of other players’ tasks, while, oppositely,
an individual behavior, modeled by a full self-directed in-
teraction motive orientation, could be implicitly incentivized
by rewarding players who contributed to the completion of
their own tasks. To test the validity of these assumptions, we
deployed two different score attribution systems in a word-
matching game named Message Across, and conducted several
user tests, where participants did not know how the games
were scored. The results indicated accentuated tendencies for
the promotion of both altruistic and individual behavior, as
highly significant differences, aligned to our expectations,
were observed for the players’ strategies and self-reported
interaction motive orientations. In particular, the self-oriented
version drove players to perform a high number of takes and
an altruism-oriented version drove players to perform a low
number of takes. Besides, these diverging players’ strategies
allowed the self-oriented version to motivate players to focus
on themselves, and the altruism-oriented version to motivate
players to focus on other players.
Future research includes the investigation of whether indi-
vidual differences such as personality have an effect on how
people vary their playing strategies and interaction motives
regarding individual and altruistic behavior. We also believe
that varying the size of words or using different numbers of
shared letters is worthwhile to verify how the length and type
of the task may have an impact on the players’ focus and
playing styles. A cross cultural study would also be interesting,
given the already presented tendency for culture to influence
players’ strategies and behavior evaluations [5], [30].
Furthermore, we can extend the analysis of interaction
motives and playing styles to interactions beyond the ones
measured in the present study. In fact, we can analyze our
interactions motives scale in higher granularity, by considering
the less symmetric behaviors such as Mutual Help (also
acknowledged by some of the presented related research of
Section II) and Competition.
Finally, our findings also contribute to the field of au-
tomatic education and training, due to the importance of
behavior promotion for this research topic. Models such as
GIMME [31], that aim to optimize the collective ability of
groups of people interacting with one another, may use scores
to mediate students’ interactions, thus empowering collective
teaching in multiplayer settings. Furthermore, promoting in-
teraction styles using rewards allows researchers to take a
more human approach to the integration of agents that simulate
people in serious games, besides adding expressiveness to their
simulation models.
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